Although the article describes Gerasimov’s thoughts on means, phases and broad actions (ways) used in the new operational concept, it does not depict the effects and goals the RFAF wants to achieve with these actions nor does it depict how the RFAF uses social conditions in support of them.ĭuring the Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine conflicts, Russia established civilian capabilities such as youth groups and state media and mobilized Russian ethnic minorities abroad by appealing to feelings of marginalization, a sense of self-worth and belonging, and a perception that Mother Russia has more to offer than the native country. Gerasimov explains that the RFAF developed situational unique planning models to apply military and non-military means such as SOF, proxy forces, civil media and cyber capabilities to influence all actors, disturb communication and destabilize regions in order to achieve its objectives. In February 2014, the Chief of the General Staff of the RFAF, General Valery Gerasimov, was the first to describe a framework for the new operational concept based on the lessons of the Estonia and Georgia conflicts (figure 1). Vital to the new operational concept was the swift destruction, disruption, or control of communications, economics, infrastructure and political institutions to disrupt command and control of the enemy, with the use of proxy forces on land and in the cyber domain. In 2003, Russia released a white paper in support of this new policy that described a change in military thinking and defined a new operational concept based on the integration of strategic, operational and tactical elements. In reality, the RFAF has changed its way of war into an operational concept to achieve the objectives of its near-abroad policy: establishing a sphere of influence in the former Soviet States, to protect Russian interests and ethnic Russian minorities abroad. Moreover, most of them are based on Western assumptions about the Russian way of war, using military means within the traditional domains of air, sea, and land, expanded with the new cyber domain. However, most of these studies have a limited scope with only a focus on military hardware. Others also speculate how Russia would use cyber capabilities in future conflicts. Western military experts were especially interested in the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ (RFAF) operational lessons, and the way they complemented their conventional military with SOF, airborne, and naval infantry as rapid reaction forces. Western analyses of these conflicts have focused on the different forces Russia used to achieve its goals: cyber forces in Estonia, conventional forces in Georgia, and special operations forces (SOF) in the Crimea area of Ukraine. In recent years, Russia has conducted operations in former Soviet states to prevent NATO and EU from expanding their sphere of influence into areas formerly part of the Soviet Union. The concept has six subsequent phases and – from Moscow’s point of view – proved to be a successful approach to take over the Crimea region from Ukraine. The concept is based on lessons of the recent Estonia and Georgia conflicts and is characterized by a shift towards the use of non-military means and non-traditional domains, such as youth groups, cyber attacks, civil media and proxy forces. The Chief of the General Staff of the RFAF, General Valery Gerasimov, was the first to describe a framework for the new operational concept toachieve the objectives of Moscow’s near-abroad policy. Moscow uses the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF), which have developed a way of war that goes way beyond the use of military hardware alone. In recent years Russia has conducted operations in several former Soviet states to establish a sphere of influence in those countries, prevent NATO and the EU from expanding and protect Russian interests and ethnic Russian minorities abroad.
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